An adequate normative regulation isa prerequisite for a successful implementation of the competition policy as a fundament of a market economy is. With current legal solutions in the fi eld of the competition policy, Serbia has provided the necessary institutional framework for the effi cient functioning of the market and the establishment of eff ective competition on it. The eff ectiveness of this framework is necessary to evaluate through a market analysis, based on the results achieved in creating a climate that encourages the development of competition. The compatibility of legislation with the European Union standards and its practical application are the basic assumptions of the purposeful operating of institutions. The modest results of the competition policy in Serbia impose the need to increase institutional capacity, upgrade the regulation and its conceiving in a manner that will ensure the construction of an effi cient market economy. In this sense, the paper analyzes the key elements of the institutional framework that determine the eff ectiveness of the competition policy. Special a$ ention will be paid to the practical application of this framework, which will be illustrated by a critical review of the manner and method of decision-making by the Serbian Commission for the Protection of Competition in its procedures in monopolized markets.
INTRODUCTION
One of the main tasks of any country is to create a favorable environment for the expression of individual preferences of the population and economic entities, and their alignment with collective preferences. In the economic area, it means creating conditions for achieving enterprises' and consumers' goals, which leads to economic effi ciency, both at the micro level and the level of the entire economy. According to that, an important task of the government is creating a necessary market infrastructure, i.e. market institutions. The market is not stochastic; it is an arranged set of supply and demand relationships. With adequate legal regulations, the government clearly determines the framework of economic entities' behavior and stability in expressing their interests and achieving goals. By clearly defi ning the rules of conduct and the scope for the economic activity, the state impacts the relationship between economic actors and the environment and also creates conditions for achieving the highest possible level of social welfare.
In economic theory, the potential eff ectiveness of economies is known to be based on competition. Proceeding from this, economic theory is directly or indirectly used for designing legislation in the competition area. In addition, it must indicate the mode of the application of positive legislation.
The fi rst task is related to defi ning the standards which legislation must follow in deciding on a possible violation of competition conditions. These are the socalled conditions of eff ective competition. Competition could accomplish more functions. One of the most important is to protect market participants from the excessive market power of fi rms and abuses that can arise from it. In this way, the state takes over a general social task which basically boils down to the protection of individuals and fi rms. Another important goal is to improve the ability of companies and their technical progress. These targets lead to raising the standard of living and overall social progress.
The mission of the competition policy is to harmonize competition conditions in all parts of the market for all market participants. The openness of particular markets is a prerequisite for encouraging companies to be cost-eff ective, innovative and inventive. Increasing prosperity in companies increases the total welfare. Unbridled competition, which involves the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, opens the door to a synergetic eff ect of diff erent factors. In doing so, the market should be free from the negative consequences of the government's infl uence, illegal actions and non-tariff barriers between countries. The task of economics is to defi ne the relevant market and identify the abuse of the dominant position. Additionally, it is important that an analysis of apotential distortion of competition, created by merging companies on the relevant market, should be carried out. The Law on Competition regulates and o& en intervenes in cases of the violation of legal norms in this area. In fact, it seems ironic that control and intervention should promote free competition. The second paradox concerns the democratic principle of the freedom of individuals which opposes the freedom of the redefi nition of their relationship (Jones & Sufrin, 2001, 6 ).
The competition policy involves a very complex process that, in some segments, may evenbe controversial. The fact is that monopolies are desirable in certain industries and atcertain moments. To add, the determination of the relevant market involves a high degree of arbitrariness and subjectivity, the control of concentrations is based on assumed (future) eff ects on the competition intensity and economic effi ciency. Because of that, the process of defi ning specifi c goals of the competition is impossible to standardize precisely, and the competition policy is under constant pressure of a shallow and superfi cial analysis as well as intentions of business and political circles to present market conditions in accordance with their own interest positions (Stojanović & Radivojević, 2010, 337) .
However, this area is characterized by frequent diff erences inscientifi c experts'opinions, and even those expressed by members of the state body for the protection of competition. When these diff erences in opinions become particularly large, there is a doubt about the authenticity of research results, and even the legal merits of a particular procedure. Nocompetition system is exempt from these diff erences; however,they seem to be more common in countries applying them for a short period of time, such as almost all transitional economies. Typically, in such countries, their regulations and practical activity in this area arenot suffi ciently defi ned and reliable. The main reason for this is a lack of an institutional framework and an inadequate implementation of the law.
In developed countries, competitive institutions have gradually evolved over hundreds of years into eff ective ones due to the present form. Serbia has beentrying to make up for the part o& hat historic delay since 2005, and, by using good economic concepts and accumulated experience, to carry out quick reforms and build new and effi cient institutions in this fi eld.
One of the most powerful incentives for (economic) reforms in Serbia is itsmembership with theEuropean Union (EU). The integration process involves building an institutional infrastructure compatible with modern institutions of developed market economies. In the fi eld of the competition policy, it comprisesthe adoption of laws, the establishment of regulatory bodies and the practical activity aligned with the competition policy in the EU. However, the formal harmonization of the regulatory framework with legal regulations in the EU, with the lack of its practical application, only temporarily satisfi es the standards of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and does not lead to the establishment of eff ective competition in the market. Disposing of substantial reforms carries on the risk that the accumulated problems will signifi cantly limit economic effi ciency and economic growth in the future, thus makingthe process of satisfying other (future) requirements for the EU accession more diffi cult.
Using the method of scientifi c observation and testing, and the method of a comparative analysis, the paper tests the hypothesis of an underdeveloped institutional framework for the eff ective implementation of the competition policy in Serbia. The aim of the paper is to point out the advantages and disadvantages of the competition policy institutional framework in Serbia and accordingly formulate valid recommendations for the policy implementation in the future through a critical consideration of all its aspects.
COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The competition policy is an important part of the economic policy determining general conditions for economic entities' behavior in the market. It involves defi ning the goals, instruments and holders of the measure implementation (policy-makers). The market functionality is realized by providing conditions for aneffi cient and open market economy through preventing or removing market restrictions. The competition policy includes the following activities: analyzingthe market relationships, diagnosingthe competition limits, taking measures to stimulate competition and identifying and implementing measures for the protection of competition. The main objective of these activities is to provide and maintain competition conditions through: 1) eliminating artifi cial and voluntary activities of the companies or countries having a weakening infl uence on the competition and 2) improving competition conditions with respect to natural limitations (Stojanović, 2003, 27) . In an eff ort to achieve the goals of the competition policy, the regulatory role of the responsible state and/or independent institutions is essential. Due to aninherent tendency to restrict the competition, the authorities have an obligation to take measures against the holders of the alleged actions. The measures of the protection of competition are directed towards companies, on the one hand, and thestate or quasigovernmental funds, on the other.
At the EU level, which puts a positive landmark in the process of establishing the national systems and creating a national competition policy, the competition policy seeks to ensure a delicate balance of various objectives. All goals should promote eff ective competition by ensuring aneffi cient allocation of resources. Thus,the given task suggests an answer to the question what the subject of the competition policy is. It is the economic effi ciency achieved by the competition in the market which provides the optimal allocation of limited resources. One of the primary intentions is the forming of competitive market structures. Proceeding from this, competition is a tool allowing the stability and total eff ective utilization of a business potential. The economic interests of the two basic types of economic (market) actors -enterprises and households -have an important place in the competition policy. Increasing competitive capacity and economic effi ciency is related to another goal -to increasing consumer welfare. Therefore, competition is understood as a process of constant change in which the profi t and usefulness are motives for an economic activity. In achieving the maximum profi t, as a target function of fi rms, or the maximum utility as a target function of the consumer, transactions are conducted with agoal to achieve the economic optimum. In anopen-market economy, an increase in social welfare, with a discrete and selective control and authority over the behavior of economic agents, is achieved. This view of competition involves a dynamic process of building new institutions or upgrading the existing onesthat would contribute to achieving economic growth and development, thus improving the economic performance of the economy.
Pertaining to Serbia's commitment to the European integration processes, a competition policy compliant with the European standards should be designed.
An eff ective competition policy, able to provide quality competition and new players'smooth entry into the domestic market, has a positive impact on the competitiveness of the country, a$ racting foreign and domestic investments and infl uencing domestic companies' competences in their inclusion in competitive markets.
The Law on Competition is an important tool available to countries in the process of constituting an eff ective competition policy. In this sense, and as a necessary condition for thefunctioning market economy and progress of Serbia towards European integrations in recent years, it has beennoted that the adoption of the following two laws iscrucial: the Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC) and the Law on the State Aid Control (LSAC), which will refl ect the basic rules of the EU in this area. It was necessary to legally round up anextremely important area, with signifi cant implications forthe internal development and international position of the country.
THE RESULTS OF THE COMPETITION POLICY IN SERBIA IN COMPARISON WITH NEIGHBOR COUNTRIES
The achieved results of the competition policy implementation in Serbia as well as institutions' effi ciency and the legal framework can be traced by analyzing globally-accepted indicators. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) evaluates the progress of transition countries in the fi eld of the competition policy by indicators ranging from 1 to 4.33. Indicator 1 means the absence of legislation and institutions for the protection of competition, while indicator 4.33 is given to the countries which achieve the standards and performance typical ofdeveloped countries (EBRD, 2011, 174 According to the EBRD, Croatia -with a score of 3, which involves taking signifi cant actions in the fi eld of the competition policy and preventing the abuse of the dominant position -is the top ranked country in the region. Serbia, a& er the initial positive assessment of 1.67 in 2006, wasmakingprogress in the next year. A& er that, Serbia stagnated and the fi rst positive step and its shi& ingtoindicator 2.33 occurred in 2010. The nature of the EBRD indicators induces the fact that they are directly dependent on and conditioned by the development of institutions and legislation in the competition policy area.
Experience shows, and the current practice in Serbia fully confi rms, that the most diffi culties in transitional countries relate to forming a modern market structure that would be in function of providing intensive and eff ective competition between businesses entities. Accordingly, the competition policy implementation in Serbia is a very sensitive issue requiringa big loadhard work.
The extent to which Serbia is being faced with problems in the competition policy implementationand the manner in which it refl ects its international competitiveness is clearly accounted forin the World Economic Forum study for the year 2011. According to this study, out of 142 monitored countries, Serbia is ranked at the 95th place, with a score of 3.88 (World Economic Forum, 2011, 314) . Analyzing the reasons that led to a relatively low index of Serbia's international competitiveness, it is evident that a particular weakness lies in the low ranking of some "pillars of international competitiveness". Namely, out of twelve "pillars of competitiveness", Serbia has the worst ranking in terms of goods market effi ciency (132nd place). However, it is necessary to identify the weakest "sub-pillars of international competitiveness" to complete the analysis of Serbia's low global competitiveness, namely: the eff ectiveness o$ he anti-monopoly policy (rank 137) and the extent of the market dominance (rank 139). The Law on Competition was adopted in Serbia in 2005, by which the Antimonopoly Law, having been in force between 1996 and 2005, and having not generated meaningful results, was abolished. Despite the fact that the law represented a step forward in the fi eld of the legal regulation of competition, it is evident now that ithad its shortcomings. The criticism and negative consequences of inadequate solutions in the law exceeded the benefi ts of its application. The subject ma& er of the law was being criticized. Article 1,defi ning the subject ma& erand purpose of the Law, cited that "the protection of competition in the market has been regulated, in order to ensure the equality of the market participants and encourage the economic effi ciency and the achievement of theeconomic wellbeing of society as a whole, particularly consumers" (Law on the Protection of Competition, 2005) . According to critics, there are several inaccuracies,even contradictions, in this respect. The objective of the law should be the protection of competition as a process whose unfolding brought numerousbenefi ts to society, and did not protect existing competitors (the equality of participants). Furthermore, the most criticized drawbacks of the Law from 2005 were tied to: a) penalties preventing or, at least, signifi cantly impedingan eff ective action against those who violatethe Law, since the Commissionfor the Protection of Competition (Commission) had very limited powers to impose penalties and, practically, could only bring misdemeanor charges, b) an irrationally low threshold of the annual income giving rise to the obligation of thenotifi cation of concentration, c) the position of the Commission and (to) guaranteeing its independence; d) exemptions from theapplying of the Law to persons engaged in the activities of a common interest (Skopljak, 2007, 66) .
The approving of the market concentration is a function which was completely le$ to the Commission. However, the extremely low threshold for the notifi cation of the concentration (the annual income of all parties in the concentration more than 10 million euros) led to a series of problems. Given the easy feasibility of the mentioned income level, this legal defi nition of the threshold resulted in overloadingthe Commission throughrequests for the approval of the concentration. In this manner, the Commission had li$ le time for focusing on more important cases of the distortion of free competition, the abuse of the dominant position and restrictive agreements. In addition, , the doublemeaning and a lack of precision in defi ning the dominant position of the relevant market and the relevant geographic marketwere pointed out as the shortcomings of the Law. Finally, the Law gave the government a hugediscretion in prescribing the conditions, criteria and regulations toregulateeach relevant area of the competition policy. As a result of the above mentioned, a& er a relatively short period of time, a need for making changes in the legislation emerged, as well as did knowledge that such a change is not suffi cientby itself. In addition to the modifi cations of the law, it was equally important to work on the adoption of an appropriate methodology for making decisions on the protection of competition, in accordance with the practices of leading European Commissions (Labus, 2008, 18) .
A& er the Law from 2005, the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed in the year 2008, which featured the protection of competition as one of Serbia'smost important obligations in the EU integration process (The Stabilization and Association Agreement, 2008). Depending on theway competition is distorted in the Single European Market, the Community Competition Law includes several parts: restrictive practices and cartels, the abuse of the dominant market position and control of integration, the state aid and state monopolies (Spasić, 2007, 62) . The SAA contains provisions closely aligned with much of the legislation and the intentions of the EU in the fi eld of competition. By signing the Agreement, Serbia has accepted the obligation of building institutions and adopting a legal framework that will encompass all these areas of the Community Competition Law. In this way, the question of competition in Serbia has gained its international dimension, due to the fact that the domestic economy, because of itssize and geographic positioning, cannot be excluded from global fl ows. Any restrictive agreement and any abuse of the dominant position may have cross-border eff ects, the fi ght against anticompetitive behavior in Serbia is no longera mereobligation of the state towards its citizens, but also its international obligations towards the EU (Graić-Stepanović, 2007, 5) . All requirements arising fromthe SAA in terms of competition, except for the area of the state aid, were covered by the Law on the Protection of Competition and did not constitute a novelty. The only novelty was the international control and supervision of the implementation of the defi ned rules.
The protection of competition in the context of the Law from 2009
As a result of the ineffi ciency and lack of results of the old law from 2005, the new Law on the Protection of Competition wasadopted in Serbia in 2009. The aim was to remove the criticized shortcomings of the old law in order to fi nallycreate conditions for fair competition, which wouldcontribute to the realization of the internal priorities of the country and meet its international obligations. Since the new law is compatible with the prevailing rules of the EU in the fi eld of the competition policy, its use is expected to ensure an improved quality of the supply of goods and services to citizens at a lower cost and tocontribute to Serbia'sintegration process. The emphasis is on the effi cient sanctioning of the distortion of competition, providing more effi cient ways to prevent the abuse of the dominant market position and the control of the creation of market integration. The law gives more powers to the Commission, which will be more eff ective in proving the existence of abuses and will punish the perpetrators. The increased threshold for the obligatory notifi cation of the concentration at 20 million euros and, in that sense, the relieved capacity of the Commission will be putin the service of preventing more serious cases of the distortion of competition.
The specifi c objectives of the concept of the new law can be systematized as follows: a) the specifying and adequate transposition of the material competition rules applicable in the EU, b) the reduction of the burden of administrative procedures for business entities in the sense of obligations of notifi cation, by raising the control threshold, c) creating legal and organizational conditions for capacity building and the expansion of procedural powers of the Commission; d) authorizing the Commission to implement eff ective and applicable measures in the cases of the distortion of competition; e) the improvement of the procedural and legal regimes (Graić-Stepanović, 2007, 6) . The law provides a systematic and meaningful way of determining the basic legal institutions and terms in the fi eld of competition. The procedure determiningapotential distortion of competition has been ru$ ing in front of the Commission ina comprehensive manner, with apossibility of the participation and cooperation of all stakeholders.
Authorizations of the Commission for the Protection of Competition
The In the new LPC, two types of measures to remove a distortion of competition are defi ned: behavioral measures and structural measures. The Commission may determine measures aimed at eliminatingadistortion of competition and at preventingapossibility of the same or similar distortions in a decision by which a distortion of competition is established, by giving orders to behave in a particular way or prohibit certain behavior (a behavioral measure). However, if a signifi cant risk of repeating the same or similar distortion is determined as a direct result of the structure of market participants, the Commission may determine ameasure that would be aimedatchanging this structure in order to eliminate such adventures, and at establishingthestructure that existed before the violation (structural measures). The new LPC provides themeasure of a procedural penaltyin article 70, according to which it is determined that a market participant should pay penalties in the amount of 500 euros to 5.000 euros for each day of conduct contrary to the Commission's order given in the proceedings.
The administrative capacity of the Commission for the Protection of Competition
Notwithstanding the undeniable progress in the legal regulation of the activities carried out by the Commission, it is still necessary that its institutional and administrative capacity should be promoted and its personnel be continuously educated and trained for taking an eff ective action. It is needed that an emphasis should be put on building an institutional capacity and providing professional staff for the purpose of an economic analysis, in order to timely detect a distortion of competition in the market. Furthermore, it is necessary the work of similar bodies in other countries should be monitored in order to learn on the experiences of countries with a good antitrust practice. According to a report from the year 2010, the national Commission employs a total of 29 people. Seventeen employees are entrusted with tasks which are the scope of the Commission (work on subjects), two persons are employed in the Domestic and International Cooperation Sector, while 10 employeesdeal with joint operations for the sectors directly concerned with the protection of competition. Comparing the number of employees in the national Commission and the number of employees in the bodies of the Competition in EU member states, ageneral conclusion can be reachedthat Serbia has fewer employees. However, this comparison should be viewed as provisional, some national bodies for the protection of competition exercise consumer protection, state aid and public procurement control (Commission for the Protection of Competition, 2011a, p. 8). Graph 1 shows the comparative view of the number of employees in the bodies of the Competition in Serbia and countries in the region in the year 2010, in total and on the work scope of the Commission (work on subjects).
Compared with neighbor countries, Serbia has a greater number of employees, in total and on the subjects, than most countries. Thenumber of employees is higher only in the Croatian body for the protection of Competition, but it is a country in the region with the best antitrust practice.
Graph 1
The number of employees in the bodies for the protection of competition (2010) Source: Ganon & Petaković, 2011, 94 Source: Annual Reports of the Commission for the Protection of Competition, 2006 Competition, -2010 The predominant activity of the national Commission from its constitution in the year 2005 was the one of approving theconcentration. Signifi cant forms of the distortion of competition in the market, the abuse of the dominant position and restrictive agreements, were far less common in the practice of the Commission. Table 3 accounts foran overview of the subjects of the national Commission for the Protection of Competition in the time period from 2006 to 2010.
Only in 2010 was there a reduction in the number of requests for approving the concentration. This is the result of passing a new law that increased the threshold of the total annual revenue requirement for a mandatory notifi cation of concentration (in the previous law, it had beenset at an unrealistically low level). However, there was an increase in the number of cases considering the abuse of the dominant position and restrictive agreements between market participants. Graph 2 demonstrates a comparative overview of the number of notifi cations of concentrations in Serbia and countries in the region.
Political interference in this area has generated frequent diff erences inexpert and impartial circles' opinions and analyses, and eventhe opinions and analyses made and conducted, respectively, by the representative body for the protection of competition. When these diff erences in a$ itudes seem as particularly large, a doubt in the obtained researches and even in the legal basis of a particular procedure grows. . If a higher level of competition existed inthis market, the margin would be within a normal framework, and it would not be necessary for the Regulation to be adopted. Thus, the state indirectly aff ected the retailpricing with its interventionist measures, which suggests that the state is not (was not) able to establish eff ective competition in this market by means of the instruments of the competition policy. Also, the mentioned Regulation has had a negative impact on small retailers (the so-called shops in the neighborhood), whose business largely depends on the margins on basic foodstuff s. A large number of such shops were forced to suspend their business or operate at aconsiderable loss by restricting the margins on these products. According to the Serbian Employers Union, 875 small shops were closed and 3,430 people lost their jobs in the time period from 1 January (when the Regulation entered into force) to 15 February 2012.
It is quite legitimate to ask what the situation is like whenmargins on products not classifi ed as basic foods are concerned. Since such products are not used to meet the basic needs, they can be divided into groups of more or less luxury goods, and it is quite reasonable to have a doubt that margins on some of these products do exceed 50%.
Graph 2 The number of notifi cations of concentration in Serbia and countries in the region (2010)
Source: Ganon & Petaković, 2011, 96 Notwithstanding the fact that the number of applications of concentrations to the Commission was undoubtedly reduced in 2010, Serbia still has the highest number of applications in comparison with the countries in the region. The intention of the new law that the capacity of the Commission should serve the purpose of the control and sanctioning of serious disturbances in the market hasnot ledto major positive changes.
The consequences of an inadequate institutional capacity
On the basis of the previous analysis of the regulatory framework, the institutional and administrative capacities of the Commission, it is clear that it is not given due weight to the protection of competition in Serbia. Therefore, the Serbian economic system isnot amarket system in anordinary sense. Laws are (were) usually poor and o& en not referred to, and the state and politics informally assumed the role of an omnipotent arbiter which predominantly aff ects all economic fl ows.
CONCLUSION
Whether because of the inadequate legislation, a lack of an institutional capacity, incompetence, political pressure or something else, it seems that the competition policy in Serbia is de facto a policy of protecting monopolies from competitors. In the absence of a comprehensive and coherent, harmonized and long-term strategy of institutional reforms, it can result in theoverlapping of and even confl icting withsome institutional interventions, the waste of professional resources, time and money, and an increase inother dysfunctional costs. This is not pleading for a rigid and centralized reforming option; however, it is pleading for planned and coordinated reform interventions that will raise institutionalization processes tothe level of the standards established by developed countries, with anaim to reduce the existing institutional defi cit.
The created transitional recession occurred as a result of economic restructuring and adjusting to new business conditions without a synchronized change of institutions.In addition, it seems that a political consensus on the necessity of a radical intervention in the competition policy areawas not reached. Considering the delay in creating a legal basis and appropriate institutions, it is necessary that the regulation of this important area in transitional economies should continuously be improving. This is one of the preconditions for thefundamental reconstruction of the economy and society. Without leaving the strategic orientation, the creators of transition processes in Serbia need to makecorrections in designing and implementing economic and systemic solutions, eliminate the discrepancy between the norms and the currentsituation, and thus prevent the already achieved results from being compromised. Starting from the poor performance of the economy and the ineffi ciency of institutions, a clear criticism was madeo& he previous engineering of transition in the fi eld of the competition policy in paper. Thus, a basis for further research and the identifi cation of the causes was created, describing the characteristics and establishment of a tendency in the development of this important area of the economic policy. 
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Preduslov za uspešno sprovođenje politike zaštite konkurencĳ e kao temelja tržišne ekonomĳ e je adekvatno normativno regulisanje. Sa aktuelnim zakonskim rešenjima u oblasti zaštite konkurencĳ e, Srbĳ a je obezbedila neophodan institucionalni okvir za efi kasno funkcionisanje tržišta i uspostavljanje delotvorne konkurencĳ e na njemu. Efi kasnost tog okvira neophodno je ocenjivati analizom tržišta, a na osnovu rezultata postignutih u kreiranju ambĳ enta koji podstiče razvoj konkurencĳ e. Kompatibilnost pravne regulative sa standardima Evropske unĳ e i njena dosledna praktična primena predstavljaju osnovne pretpostavke svrsishodnog funkcionisanja institucĳ a. Skromni rezultati politike zaštite konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i nameću potrebu za povećanjem institucionalnog kapaciteta, dogradnjom regulative i njenim koncipiranjem na način koji će obezbediti izgradnju efi kasne tržišne privrede. U tom smislu, u radu se istražuju ključni elementi institucionalnog okvira koji opredeljuju efi kasnost politike zaštite konkurencĳ e. Posebna pažnja se posvećuje praktičnoj primeni ovog okvira, što je ilustrovano kritičkim osvrtom na način i metod odlučivanja Komisĳ e za zaštitu konkurencĳ e u vođenju postupaka na monopolizovanim tržištima.
Ključne reči: zaštita konkurencĳ e, institucĳ e, monopol, tržište, Srbĳ a i zemlje u okruženju
JEL Classifi cation: D02, D42, K21
UVOD Jedan od osnovnih zadataka svake države je stvaranje što povoljnĳ eg ambĳ enta za ispoljavanje individualnih preferencĳ a stanovništva i privrednih subjekata i njihovo usklađivanje sa kolektivnim preferencĳ ama. Na ekonomskom planu to znači stvaranje preduslova za ostvarivanje ciljnih funkcĳ a preduzeća i potrošača, što vodi efi kasnosti privređivanja, kako na mikro nivou, tako i na nivou cele privrede. Stvaranje neophodne tržišne infrastrukture, odnosno, institucĳ a tržišta pri tome predstavlja važan zadatak države.
Tržište nĳ e stohastično, već predstavlja uređeni skup odnosa ponude i tražnje. Uz to, adekvatnom pravnom regulativom država jasno određuje okvire ponašanja ekonomskih subjekata, stabilnost u ispoljavanju interesa i ostvarivanju ciljeva. Jasnim defi nisanjem pravila ponašanja i prostora za ekonomsku aktivnost država utiče na odnos ekonomskih aktera i okruženja stvarajući uslove za postizanje što većeg stepena društvenog blagostanja.
U ekonomskoj teorĳ i su poznate potencĳ alne efi kasnosti privreda zasnovanih na konkurencĳ i.
Polazeći od toga, ekonomska teorĳ a direktno ili indirektno služi za osmišljavanje zakonske regulative u oblasti konkurencĳ e. Ona uz to mora da ukaže na način primene pozitivnog zakonodavstva.
Prvi zadatak se svodi na defi nisanje normi od kojih mora da pođe pravna regulativa u odlučivanju o eventualnom narušavanju uslova konkurencĳ e. To su uslovi tzv. efektivne konkurencĳ e. Konkurenicĳ a bi trebalo da ostvari više funkcĳ a. Jedna od najvažnĳ ih je zaštita tržišnih aktera od prekomerne tržišne moći preduzeća i zloupotreba koje mogu iz toga da proisteknu. Na taj način se preuzima i opštedruštveni zadatak koji se u osnovi svodi na zaštitu pojedinaca i preduzeća. Drugi značajan cilj koji se ostvaruje zaštitom konkurencĳ e je podizanje sposobnosti preduzeća i njihovog tehničkog napretka. Ovi ciljevi vode ka podizanju životnog standarda stanovništva i opštem društvenom napretku.
Misĳ a politike zaštite konkurencĳ e je ujednačavanje uslova konkurencĳ e na svim delovima tržišta i za sve tržišne aktere. Pri tome je otvorenost pojedinačnih tržišta uslov za podsticanje preduzeća na ekonomičnost, inovativnost i inventivnost. Povećanjem blagostanja u preduzećima povećava se i ukupno blagostanje. Neometana konkurencĳ a koja podrazumeva slobodno kretanje dobara, usluga, kapitala i ljudi otvara prostor za sinergĳ sko delovanje različitih faktora. Pri tome bi tržište trebalo biti oslobođeno negativnih posledica uticaja vlada, nezakonskih supsidĳ a i netarifnih barĳ era između zemalja. Zadatak ekonomske nauke je defi nisanje relevantnih tržišta i identifi kovanje zloupotrebe dominantnog položaja. Uz to, važna je i analiza potencĳ alnog narušavanja konkurencĳ e nastalog spajanjem preduzeća sa relevantnog tržišta.
Pravo konkurencĳ e reguliše, a često i interveniše u slučajevima povreda pravnih normi u ovoj oblasti. Deluje ironično da se kontrolom i intervencĳ om treba promovisati slobodna konkurencĳ a. Drugi paradoks se tiče demokratskog načela slobode pojedinaca koji se suprotstavljaju slobodi uređenja njihovih odnosa (Jones & Sufrin, 2001, 6) .
Politika zaštite konkurencĳ e podrazumeva veoma složen proces koji u određenim segmentima može biti čak i kontroverzan. Činjenica je da su monopoli u određenim sektorima privrede i u određenom trenutku poželjni. Uz to, postupak određivanja relevantnog tržišta podrazumeva visok stepen arbitrarnosti i subjektivnosti, a kontrola koncentracĳ a se vrši na osnovu pretpostavljenih (budućih) efekata po intenzitet konkurencĳ e i ekonomsku efi kasnost. Zato je proces defi nisanja određenih ciljeva zaštite konkurencĳ e nemoguće precizno standardizovati, a politika zaštite konkurencĳ e je pod stalnim pritiskom površnih i instruisanih analiza, kao i namera određenih poslovnih i političkih krugova da stanje na tržištu predstave u skladu sa sopstvenom interesnom pozicĳ om (Stojanović & Radivojević, 2010, 337) .
Ovu oblast, međutim, karakterišu i česta razmimoilaženja u stavovima naučne i stručne javnosti, pa čak i predstavnika tela za zaštitu konkurencĳ e. Kad se te razlike u stavovima pokažu kao posebno velike, narasta sumnja u dobĳ ene istraživačke nalaze, pa čak i u zakonsku zasnovanost određenog postupka. Nĳ edan sistem zaštite konkurencĳ e nĳ e oslobođen ovih razlika, ali se čini da su one učestalĳ e u zemljama sa nedovoljnim iskustvom u njegovoj primeni. Po pravilu, u takvim zemljama regulativa i praktična aktivnost u ovoj oblasti nĳ e dovoljno i pouzdano defi nisana. Osnovni razlog za to je nedovoljno izgradjen institucionalni okvir.
U razvĳ enim zemljama institucĳ e zaštite konkurencĳ e su postepeno evoluirale, da bi dospele do današnjih efi kasnih oblika. Srbĳ a zvanično od 2005. godine pokušava da nadoknadi makar deo tog istorĳ skog zakašnjenja i, koristeći dobre ekonomske koncepte i nagomilana iskustva, brzo izvede reforme i izgradi nove i efi kasne institucĳ e u ovoj oblasti.
Jedan od najsnažnĳ ih podsticaja (ekonomskim) reformama u Srbĳ i jeste učlanjenje u EU. Proces pridruživanja podrazumeva izgradnju institucionalne infrastrukture kompatibilne sa modernim institucĳ ama razvĳ enih tržišnih privreda. U oblasti zaštite konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i to znači usvajanje zakona, formiranje regulatornih tela i praktičnu aktivnost usklađenu sa intencĳ ama politike zaštite konkurencĳ e u EU. Međutim, formalna harmonizacĳ a regulatornog okvira sa zakonskim rešenjima u EU, uz izostanak njegove dosledne primene, samo prividno i privremeno zadovoljava standarde Sporazuma o stabilizacĳ i i pridruživanju i sama po sebi ne dovodi do uspostavljanja delotvorne konkurencĳ e na tržištu. Odlaganje suštinskih reformi nosi rizik da nagomilani problemi bitno ograniče ekonomsku efi kasnost i privredni rast u narednom periodu, a time i otežaju zadovoljavanje drugih (budućih) uslova za pristupanje EU.
U radu se metodama naučnog posmatranja i ispitivanja i metodom komparativne analize testira hipoteza o nedovoljno razvĳ enom institucionalnom okviru za efi kasno sprovođenje politike zaštite konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i. Cilj je da se kroz kritičko sagledavanje svih aspekata institucionalnog okvira politike zaštite konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i ukaže na njegove prednosti i nedostatke i u skladu sa tim formulišu validne preporuke za vođenje ove politike u narednom periodu.
KONKURENCĲ A I EKONOMSKA EFIKASNOST
Politika zaštite konkurencĳ e je važan deo ekonomske politike kojom se ekonomskim subjektima određuju okvirni uslovi za ponašanje na tržištu. Ona obuhvata defi nisanje ciljeva, sredstava i nosilaca sprovođenja mera (kreatora politike). Funkcionalnost tržišta se pri tome ostvaruje obezbeđivanjem uslova za efi kasnu i otvorenu tržišnu privredu sprečavanjem ili odstranjivanjem tržišnih ograničavanja. U domenu politike zaštite konkurencĳ e analiziraju se odnosi na tržištu, dĳ agnosticiraju ograničenja konkurencĳ e, preduzimaju mere za stimulisanje konkurencĳ e i utvrđuju i sprovode mere zaštite konkurencĳ e. Osnovni cilj svih tih aktivnosti je obezbeđivanje i očuvanje uslova konkurencĳ e kroz: 1) otklanjanje veštačke, svojevoljne aktivnosti preduzeća ili države koje utiču na slabljenje konkurencĳ e i 2) poboljšanje uslova za konkurencĳ u uz uvažavanje prirodnih ograničenja (Stojanović, 2003, 27) . U nastojanju da se ostvare ciljevi politike zaštite konkurencĳ e neophodna je regulativna uloga nadležnih državnih i/ili nezavisnih institucĳ a. Zbog imanentne težnje da se konkurencĳ a ograniči, nadležni organi imaju obavezu preduzimanja mera protiv nosilaca inkriminisanih postupaka. Mere zaštite uslova konkurencĳ e su usmerene, s jedne strane ka preduzećima, a, s druge strane, ka državnim ili paradržavnim fondovima. Na nivou Evropske unĳ e (EU), čĳ a praksa predstavlja pozitivan reper u procesu uspostavljanja nacionalnih sistema i kreiranja nacionalnih politika zaštite konkurencĳ e, politika konkurencĳ e nastoji da obezbedi delikatan balans različitih ciljeva. Svi ciljevi bi trebalo da promovišu efektivnu konkurencĳ u tako što će obezbediti efi kasnu alokacĳ u resursa. Ovako postavljeni zadatak sugeriše odgovor na pitanje šta je predmet politike konkurencĳ e. To je ekonomska efi kasnost postignuta tako što bi konkurencĳ a na tržištu obezbedila optimalnu alokacĳ u ograničenih resursa. Jedna od osnovnih intencĳ a je zasnivanje konkurentnih tržišnih struktura. Polazeći od toga, konkurencĳ a je instrument koji omogućava stabilnost i puno efektivno iskorišćenje potencĳ ala privrednih subjekata. Ekonomski interesi dve osnovne vrste ekonomskih (tržišnih) aktera -preduzeća i domaćinstava -imaju značajno mesto u politici zaštite konkurencĳ e. Povećanje konkurentnih sposobnosti i ekonomske efi kasnosti povezano je sa drugim ciljem -povećanjem blagostanja potrošača. Konkurencĳ a se zbog toga shvata kao proces stalnih promena u kojima su profi t i korisnost motivi ekonomskih aktivnosti. U ostvarivanju maksimuma profi ta kao ciljne funkcĳ e preduzeća ili što veće korisnosti kao ciljne funkcĳ e potrošača obavljaju se transakcĳ e kojima se teži ekonomskom optimumu. U miljeu otvorene tržišne privrede ostvaruje se povećanje društvenog blagostanja, uz diskretnu i selektivnu kontrolu i ingerencĳ u nad ponašanjem ekonomskih subjekata. Ovakav pogled na konkurencĳ u podrazumeva dinamični proces izgradnje novih ili dogradnje postojećih institucĳ a koje bi doprinele ostvarivanju ekonomskog rasta i razvoja, a time i poboljšanju ekonomskih performansi privrede.
Sa opredeljenjem za evropske integracione procese u Srbĳ i bi trebalo da se konstituiše politika zaštite konkurencĳ e koja će biti usklađena sa evropskim standardima. Efi kasna politika zaštite konkurencĳ e, koja je u stanju da obezbedi kvalitetnu tržišnu utakmicu i neometani ulazak novih igrača na domaće tržište ima pozitivan uticaj na nivo konkurentnosti zemlje, privlačenju inostranih i domaćih investicĳ a i kompetentnost domaćih preduzeća u uključivanju u konkurentsku utakmicu na razvĳ enim tržištima.
Pravo konkurencĳ e je važno sredstvo koje stoji na raspolaganju državama u procesu konstituisanja efi kasne politike zaštite konkurencĳ e. U tom smislu, kao neophodan uslov za funkcionisanje tržišne ekonomĳ e i napredak Srbĳ e na putu ka evropskim integracĳ ama u proteklim godinama bilo je istaknuto usvajanje dva zakona od suštinskog značaja, Zakona o zaštiti konkurencĳ e (ZZK) i Zakona o državnoj pomoći, koji će odražavati osnovna pravila EU u ovom domenu. Bilo je potrebno pravno zaokružiti izuzetno važnu oblast, sa značajnim implikacĳ ama i na unutrašnji razvoj i na međunarodnu pozicĳ u zemlje.
REZULTATI POLITIKE ZAŠTITE KONKURENCĲ E U SRBĲ I U POREĐENJU SA ZEMLJAMA U OKRUŽENJU Ostvareni rezultati Srbĳ e u domenu politike zaštite konkurencĳ e, kao i efi kasnost institucĳ a i utemeljenog pravnog okvira mogu se pratiti analizom globalno prihvaćenih indikatora. Evropska banka za obnovu i razvoj (EBRD) ocenama od 1 do 4,33 meri tranzicioni napredak zemalja u oblasti politike zaštite konkurencĳ e. Ocena 1 podrazumeva nepostojanje zakonodavstva i institucĳ a za zaštitu konkurencĳ e, dok se ocena 4,33 dodeljuje zemljama koje su u domenu politike zaštite konkurencĳ e postigle standarde i performanse tipične za razvĳ ene industrĳ ske zemlje (EBRD, 2011, 174) . Srbĳ a je ocenom 1 bila ocenjivana sve do 2006. godine, kada je po prvi put dobila ocenu 1,67. Zasluge za to se mogu pripisati usvojenom Zakonu o zaštiti konkurencĳ e 2005. godine. Za razliku od Srbĳ e, pojedine zemlje iz okruženja prve pozitivne ocene zabeležile su znatno ranĳ e. Tako je Hrvatska prvi put pozitivno ocenjena i to ocenom 2 još 1996. godine (iste godine je i Albanĳ a dobila ocenu 1,67). Postignuti rezultati u domenu Prema indikatorima EBRD, najbolje rangirana zemlja u okruženju je Hrvatska sa ocenom 3, koja podrazumeva preduzimanje značajnih akcĳ a u oblasti zaštite konkurencĳ e i sprečavanja zloupotrebe dominantnog položaja. Srbĳ a je posle polazne pozitivne ocene od 1,67 u 2006. godini zabeležila napredak već naredne godine. Međutim, nakon toga dolazi do stagnacĳ e i prvi pozitivan pomak i prelazak na ocenu 2,33 beleži tek u 2010. godini. Sama priroda indikatora EBRD indukuje njihovu direktnu zavisnost i uslovljenost razvĳ enošću institucĳ a i zakonodavstva u domenu politike zaštite konkurencĳ e.
Iskustva pokazuju, a aktuelna praksa u Srbĳ i to u potpunosti potvrđuje, da se u tranzicionim zemljama najveće teškoće odnose upravo na izgradnju moderne strukture tržišta koja bi bila u funkcĳ i obezbeđivanja intenzivne i efektivne konkurencĳ e između privrednih subjekata. U skladu sa time, primena politike zaštite konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i predstavlja veoma osetljivo pitanje koje zahteva mnogo strpljivog rada. U kojoj meri se Srbĳ a suočava sa problemima u sprovođenju politike zaštite konkurencĳ e i kako se to odražava na njenu međunarodnu konkurentnost jasno govori studĳ a Svetskog ekonomskog foruma za 2011. godinu. Prema navedenoj studĳ i, od 142 posmatrane zemlje, Srbĳ a zauzima 95. mesto sa ocenom 3.88 (World Economic Forum, 2011, 314) . Analizirajući razloge koji su doveli do relativno niskog indeksa međunarodne konkurentnosti Srbĳ e može se uočiti da posebna slabost leži u niskom rangu pojedinih "stubova međunarodne konkurentnosti". Naime, od ukupno dvanaest "stubova konkurentnosti", Srbĳ a je najlošĳ e rangirana u pogledu efi kasnosti tržišta dobara (132. mesto). Međutim, radi kompletiranja analize niske konkurentnosti neophodno je identifi kovati najslabĳ e "podstubove međunarodne konkurentnosti", a to su: efi kasnost antimonopolskog zakonodavstva (rang 137) i stepen dominacĳ e na tržištu (rang 139).
Tabela 2
Intenzitet konkurencĳ e i efektivnost antimonopolske politike, 2011. Jasno je da ovako niska međunarodna konkurentnost Srbĳ e nameće potrebu za povećanjem institucionalnog kapaciteta, dogradnjom regulative i koncipiranjem politike zaštite konkurencĳ e na način koji će obezbediti izgradnju efi kasne tržišne privrede.
INSTITUCIONALNI I ADMINISTRATIVNI KAPACITET ZA SPROVOĐENJE POLITIKE ZAŠTITE KONKURENCĲ E U SRBĲ I
Zaštita konkurencĳ e u kontekstu Zakona iz 2005.
Zakon o zaštiti konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i usvojen je 2005. godine, čime je prestao da važi Antimonopolski zakon koji je bio na snazi od 1996. do 2005. godine i koji nĳ e dao značajnĳ e rezultate. Bez obzira na činjenicu da je Zakon predstavljao pozitivan pomak u domenu pravnog regulisanja zaštite konkurencĳ e, danas je evidentno da je imao izražene nedostatke. Naime, kritike i negativne posledice neadekvatnih rešenja iz Zakona prevazilazile su benefi te od njegove primene. Na udaru kritika bio je sam predmet Zakona. U članu 1 koji defi niše predmet i cilj Zakona, navedeno je da se "uređuje zaštita konkurencĳ e na tržištu radi obezbeđivanja ravnopravnosti učesnika na tržištu, a u cilju podsticanja ekonomske efi kasnosti i ostvarivanja ekonomskog blagostanja društva u celini, naročito potrošača" (Zakon o zaštiti konkurencĳ e, 2005). Prema mišljenju kritičara, u ovom stavu postoji više nepreciznosti, i čak kontradikcĳ a. Naime, cilj zakona treba da bude zaštita konkurencĳ e, kao procesa čĳ im odvĳ anjem se postižu mnoge koristi za društvo, a ne zaštita postojećih konkurenata (ravnopravnost učesnika). Pored toga, najčešće su se nedostaci Zakona iz 2005. godine vezivali za: a) kaznene odredbe koje onemogućavaju ili makar značajno otežavaju delotvornu akcĳ u protiv onih koji krše Zakon, pošto je Komisĳ a za zaštitu konkurencĳ e (Komisĳ a) imala vrlo ograničena ovlašćenja da izriče kazne i praktično samo mogla da podnosi prekršajne prĳ ave; b) neracionalno nisko postavljen prag godišnjeg prihoda koji dovodi do nastanka obaveze prĳ avljivanja koncentracĳ e; c) položaj Komisĳ e i garancĳ e za njenu nezavisnost; d) izuzeća primene Zakona na lica koja se bave delatnošću od opšteg interesa (Skopljak, 2007, 66) .
Funkcĳ a koja je u potpunosti bila poverena Komisĳ i jeste odobravanje koncentracĳ a na tržištu. Međutim, izuzetno nisko postavljen prag za prĳ avu koncentracĳ e (godišnji prihod svih učesnika koncentracĳ e veći od 10 miliona evra), doveo je do niza problema. S obzirom na laku ostvarivost navedenog nivoa prihoda, ovakvo zakonsko defi nisanje praga dovelo je od preopterećenja Komisĳ e zahtevima za odobravanje koncentracĳ e. Na taj način je Komisĳ i ostavljeno malo prostora za usredsređivanje na značajnĳ e slučajeve narušavanja slobodne konkurencĳ e, zloupotrebu dominantnog položaja i restriktivne sporazume. Pored toga, kao nedostaci Zakona isticani su i dvosmislenost i nedovoljna preciznost u defi nisanju samog dominantnog položaja, relevantnog tržišta i relevantnog geografskog tržišta. Konačno, Zakon je davao vladi velika diskreciona ovlašćenja u propisivanju uslova, kriterĳ uma i odredaba kojima se reguliše svaka od relevantnih oblasti politike zaštite konkurencĳ e. Kao rezultat prethodno pomenutog, posle relativno kratkog perioda pojavila se potreba izmene zakonske regulative, ali, takođe, i saznanje da takva promena sama po sebi nĳ e dovoljna. Pored promene zakona, podjednako je važno usvajanje adekvatne metodologĳ e za donošenje odluka o zaštiti konkurencĳ e, u skladu sa praksom vodećih komisĳ a u Evropi (Labus, 2008, 18 2008) . U zavisnosti od toga na koji način se ugrožava konkurencĳ a na jedinstvenom evropskom tržištu, komunitarno pravo konkurencĳ e obuhvata nekoliko celina: restriktivna praksa i karteli, zloupotreba dominantnog položaja na tržištu i nadzor nad stvaranjem integracĳ a, državna pomoć i državni monopoli (Spasić, 2007, 62) . Sporazum o stabilizacĳ i i pridruživanju sadrži odredbe koje su blisko usklađene sa velikim delom zakonodavstva i intencĳ a EU u oblasti zaštite konkurencĳ e. Potpisivanjem Sporazuma, Srbĳ a je prihvatila obavezu izgradnje institucĳ a i usvajanja pravnog okvira kojim će biti obuhvaćene sve navedene oblasti komunitarnog prava konkurencĳ e. Na ovaj način pitanje zaštite konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i dobilo je svoju međunarodnu dimenzĳ u, s obzirom da domaća privreda i zbog veličine i zbog geografskog pozicioniranja ne može biti izuzeta iz globalnih tokova. Svaki restriktivni sporazum i svaka zloupotreba dominantnog položaja može imati prekogranični efekat, pa borba protiv monopolskog ponašanja u Srbĳ i više nĳ e samo obaveza države prema njenim građanima, nego i njena međunarodna obaveza prema EU (Graić-Stepanović, 2007, 5) . Svi zahtevi SSP u pogledu zaštite konkurencĳ e, sa izuzetkom oblasti državne pomoći, već su bili obuhvaćeni Zakonom o zaštiti konkurencĳ e i u tom smislu nisu predstavljali novinu. Novina je bila samo međunarodna kontrola i nadzor nad primenom utemeljenih pravila. . kako bi se konačno stvorili uslovi za fer tržišnu utakmicu koja će doprineti realizacĳ i unutrašnjih prioriteta zemlje i ispunjenju njenih međunarodnih obaveza. S obzirom da je novi Zakon kompatibilan sa preovlađujućim pravilima EU u domenu politike zaštite konkurencĳ e, očekivanja su da će njegova primena obezbediti kvalitetnĳ u ponudu robe i usluga građanima po povoljnĳ im cenama, i da će dati doprinos integracionim procesima Srbĳ e. Naglasak je na efi kasnĳ em sankcionisanju povrede konkurencĳ e, obezbeđivanju efi kasnĳ eg načina sprečavanja zloupotrebe dominantnog položaja i nadzora nad stvaranjem integracĳ a na tržištu. Zakon daje veća ovlašćenja Komisĳ i za zaštitu konkurencĳ e, koja će moći efi kasnĳ e da dokazuje postojanje zloupotreba i kažnjava počinioce. Povećan je prag za obaveznu prĳ avu koncentracĳ e na 20 miliona evra i u tom smislu su kapaciteti Komisĳ e rasterećeni, kako bi bili stavljeni u službu sprečavanja ozbiljnĳ ih slučajeva povrede konkurencĳ e.
Posebni ciljevi koncepta Zakona mogu se sistematizovati na sledeći način: a) preciziranje i adekvatna transpozicĳ a materĳ alnih pravila zaštite konkurencĳ e koji se primenjuju u EU; b) smanjenje tereta administrativnih procedura za privredne subjekte u pogledu obaveze notifi kacĳ e, putem podizanja praga kontrole; c) stvaranje pravnoorganizacionih uslova za jačanje kapaciteta i proširenje procesnih ovlašćenja Komisĳ e; d) davanje ovlašćenja Komisĳ i za primenu efi kasnih i primenljivih mera u slučajevima povrede konkurencĳ e; e) unapređenje procesno-pravnog režima (Graić-Stepanović, 2007, 6) . Zakon obezbeđuje sistematičnĳ i i smislenĳ i način određivanja osnovnih pravnih instituta i termina u oblasti zaštite konkurencĳ e. Postupak kojim se određuje potencĳ alna povreda konkurencĳ e se vodi na jedan celovit način pred Komisĳ om uz mogućnost participacĳ e i saradnje svih zainteresovanih strana. U Zakonu iz 2009. defi nisane su dve vrste mera otklanjanja povrede konkurencĳ e: mere ponašanja i strukturne mere. Rešenjem kojim se utvrđuje povreda konkurencĳ e, Komisĳ a može da odredi mere koje imaju za cilj otklanjanje utvrđene povrede konkurencĳ e, odnosno, sprečavanje mogućnosti nastanka iste ili slične povrede, davanjem naloga za preduzimanje određenog ponašanja ili zabrane određenog ponašanja (mere ponašanja). Međutim, ukoliko se utvrdi značajna opasnost od ponavljanja iste ili slične povrede kao neposredne posledice same strukture učesnika na tržištu, Komisĳ a može da odredi meru koja bi imala za cilj promenu u toj strukturi radi otklanjanja takve opasnosti, odnosno, uspostavljanje strukture koja je postojala pre nastupanja utvrđene povrede (strukturne mere). Zakon iz 2009, u čl. 70 predviđa i meru procesnog penala, po kome se učesniku na tržištu određuje mera plaćanja penala u iznosu od 500 evra do 5.000 evra za svaki dan ponašanja suprotno nalogu Komisĳ e datom u postupku.
Administrativni kapacitet Komisĳ e za zaštitu konkurencĳ e
Bez obzira na nesumnjivi napredak u zakonskom regulisanju aktivnosti Komisĳ e, njen institucionalni i administrativni kapacitet je potrebno i dalje unapređivati, a njeno osoblje kontinuirano usavršavati za delotvorno delovanje. Naglasak je potrebno staviti na razvĳ anje institucionalnog kapaciteta i obezbeđivanje stručnog kadra za ekonomsku analizu, u cilju pravovremenog detektovanja povrede konkurencĳ e na tržištu. Pored toga, potrebno je praćenje rada sličnih tela u drugim zemljama, kako bi se učilo na iskustvima zemalja sa dobrom antimonopolskom praksom. Prema izveštaju iz 2010. godine nacionalna Komisĳ a ima ukupno 29 zaposlenih. Na poslovima delokruga Komisĳ e (rad na predmetima) radi 17 zaposlenih, 2 zaposlena su u Sektoru za domaću i međunarodnu saradnju, dok je 10 izvršilaca uposleno na zajedničkim poslovima za potrebe sektora koji se neposredno bave zaštitom konkurencĳ e (Komisĳ a za zaštitu konkurencĳ e, 2011a, 8). Upoređivanjem broja zaposlenih u nacionalnoj komisĳ i i broja zaposlenih u telima za zaštitu konkurencĳ e u zemljama članicama EU, generalni zaključak je da Srbĳ a ima manji broj zaposlenih. Međutim, ovu komparacĳ u treba posmatrati uslovno, s obzirom da pojedina nacionalna tela za zaštitu konkurencĳ e obavljaju i poslove zaštite potrošača, državne pomoći ili kontrole javnih nabavki. Na Grafi konu 1 prikazan je komparativni pregled broja zaposlenih u telima za zaštitu konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i i zemljama u okruženju u 2010. godini ukupno i na poslovima delokruga komisĳ e (rad na predmetima).
Posledice neadekvatnog institucionalnog kapaciteta
Na osnovu dosadašnje analize regulatornog okvira, institucionalnog i administrativnog kapaciteta Komisĳ e, jasno je da se zaštiti konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i ne pridaje odgovarajući značaj. Zbog toga srpski ekonomski sistem nikako nĳ e tržišan u standardnom smislu. Zakoni su (bili) obično loši i često se nisu primenjivali, a država i politika su neformalnim putem preuzele ulogu svemoćnog arbitra koji odlučujuće utiče na sve ekonomske tokove.
Uplitanje politike u ovu oblast generisalo je česta razmimoilaženja u stavovima i analizama stručnih i nepristrasnih krugova, pa čak i predstavnika tela za zaštitu konkurencĳ e. Kad se te razlike u stavovima pokažu kao posebno velike, narasta sumnja u dobĳ ene istraživačke nalaze, pa čak i u zakonsku zasnovanost određenog postupka. Među njima je i postupak koji je Komisĳ a vodila protiv kompanĳ e Danube Foods Group (Komisĳ a za zaštitu konkurencĳ e, 2008, Komisĳ a za zaštitu konkurencĳ e, 2011b) ili pokušaja zabrane kupovine Hellenic Sugar od strane kompanĳ e Sunoko (Stojanović & Radivojević, 2011, 480-484 ; Komisĳ a za zaštitu konkurencĳ e, 2012).
Jedna od ilustracĳ a stanja konkurencĳ e na tržištima u Srbĳ i je nedavno usvojena Uredba o ograničenju marži na osnovne životne namirnice (Uredba o posebnim uslovima prometa određene robe, 2011). Da je na ovom tržištu postojao viši novo konkurencĳ e, marže bi se kretale u normalnim okvirima, pa bi donošenje Uredbe bilo nepotrebno. Ovako je država svojom intervencionističkom merom indirektno uticala na formiranje cena u maloprodaji, što ukazuje na činjenicu da ona nĳ e (bila) u stanju da instrumentima politike zaštite konkurencĳ e uspostavi delotvornu konkurencĳ u na ovom tržištu. Takođe, navedena Uredba je imala negativan uticaj na male trgovce (tzv. prodavnice u komšiluku), čĳ e poslovanje u najvećoj meri zavisi upravo od marži na osnovne životne namirnice. Ograničavanjem marži na ove proizvode, veliki broj takvih prodavnica je prinuđen da obustavi svoje poslovanje ili da posluje sa značajnim gubitkom. Prema podacima Unĳ e poslodavaca Srbĳ e, u periodu od 1. januara (kada je Uredba stupila na snagu) do 15. februara 2012. godine zatvoreno je 875 malih trgovina, a 3.430 ljudi je izgubilo posao.
Sasvim opravdano se može postaviti pitanje šta je sa maržama na proizvode koji se ne svrstavaju u osnovne životne namirnice. S obzirom da se takvi proizvodi ne koriste za zadovoljavanje osnovnih životnih potreba, oni se mogu svrstati u grupu više ili manje luksuznih dobara, te je sasvim razumna sumnja da marže na neke od ovih proizvoda premašuju 50%.
ZAKLJUČAK
Bilo da je u pitanju neadekvatna zakonska regulativa, nedovoljan institucionalni kapacitet ili politički pritisak, stiče se utisak da se politika zaštite konkurencĳ e u Srbĳ i svodi na politiku zaštite monopola od konkurenata. U odsustvu celovite i koherentne, dugoročne i harmonizovane strategĳ e institucionalnih reformi može doći do međusobnog preklapanja, pa čak i sukobljavanja pojedinih institucionalnih zahvata, rasipanja stručnih resursa, novca i vremena, kao i povećanja drugih disfunkcionalnih troškova.
Ovde se ne pledira za rigidno shvaćenu i centralizovanu plansku opcĳ u reformi, već za osmišljene i koordinirane reformske zahvate, koji će podići procese institucionalizacĳ e na nivo utvrđenih evropskih standarda, sa osnovnim ciljem da se postojeći institucionalni defi cit smanji.
Stvorena tranziciona recesĳ a nastala je kao posledica restrukturiranja privrede i prilagođavanja novim uslovima poslovanja bez sinhronizovanih promena institucĳ a. Uz to, čini se da nĳ e postignut politički konsenzus oko neophodnosti radikalnih zahvata u zaštiti konkurencĳ e. S obzirom na zakašnjenje u stvaranju pravne osnove i odgovarajućih institucĳ a, neophodno je kontinuirano unapređivanje regulacĳ e ove značajne oblasti. To je jedan od preduslova za temeljnu rekonstrukcĳ u privrede i društva. Bez neophodnosti napuštanja strategĳ skih opredeljenja, kreatori tranzicionih procesa u Srbĳ i treba da vrše dopune i korekcĳ e u koncipiranju ili implementacĳ i privredno-sistemskih rešenja kako bi se otklonio nesklad između normi i faktičkog stanja, a time i sprečilo kompromitovanje već postignutih rezultata. Polazeći od loših performansi naše privrede i neefi kasnosti institucĳ a, u radu su upućene jasne kritike dosadašnjem tranzicionom inženjeringu u oblasti zaštite konkurencĳ e. Time je stvorena osnova za dalje istraživanje i identifi kacĳ u uzroka, opisivanje karakteristika i ustanovljavanje tendencĳ a u razvoju ove važne oblasti ekonomske politike.
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